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Abstract
Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases
(or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is
characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case
lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We
show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function
from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar
result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Information that becomes available to the public prior to elections may have
unpredictable eﬀects. The fact that a presidential candidate has used drugs
in his youth may be a fatal blow to his popularity among some voters. Among
others, it may be taken as a minor misdemeanor or even a sign of an open
mind. Having been a member of a Trotzkyist party three decades before the
upcoming elections may well be viewed as a virtue by some voters, and as a
vice by others. Even less anecdotal pieces of information, such as a successful
military career, are open to various interpretations, and will typically have
diﬀerential impact on voters.
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1It follows that it is not always clear which facts, or cases will aﬀect elec-
tions in favor of a given candidate. It is even less clear how such cases interact.
Imagine, for instance, that the ex-Trotzkyist candidate has also used drugs
in his youth. Assume that none of these cases can turn a majority of vot-
ers against the candidate. But if the voters who ﬁnd that drugs are a sign
of an open mind are not those who favor Trozkyism, it is possible that the
combination of the two cases will generate a “coalition of minorities” (Downs
(1957)) against the candidate.
In this paper we consider a very simple model, according to which each
voter uses cases in an additive manner. Speciﬁcally, for each voter i,e a c h
case c, and each candidate x,t h e r ei san u m b e rwi(x,c) such that, given a







c∈M[wi(x,c) − wi(y,c)] > 0.
While this model is rather restrictive, we will see that it allows for signif-
icant freedom in terms of patterns of majority votes. Consider, for instance,
a society containing three individuals, who have to choose between candidate
x and candidate y. Suppose that there are three conceivable cases. The fol-
lowing matrix provides the value of the vector (wi(x,c) − wi(y,c))c for each
voter:
W1 c d e
1 3 −1 −1
2 −1 3 −1
3 −1 −1 3
1Gilboa and Schmeidler (1999) axiomatize this rule. They assume that the voter can
rank the candidates given any conceivable memory that is composed of repetitions of past
cases.
2Rows correspond to individuals, and columns — to cases. Thus the entry
in row i and column c is the number wi(x,c)−wi(y,c), measuring the degree
of support that case c lends to candidate x, as compared to candidate y,i n
the eyes of voter i.G i v e nt h es e tM1 = {c}, a majority of candidates favor
y to x:c a s ec convinces voter 1 that x is preferred to y, but it convinces
voters 2 and 3 of the opposite. Alternative x will also be voted down given
the set M2 = {d}: this time it is the coalition of voters 1 and 3 that oppose
alternative x. But if the union of the two sets, M1 ∪ M2 = {c,d},i sb r o u g h t
forth, voters 1 and 2 vote for x and only voter 3 prefers y. In fact, in this
example majority vote ranks alternative y above x given any single case, but
this ranking is reversed for any set that contains at least two cases. Moreover,
if all cases are cited, x is unanimously chosen.
To consider another example, consider the following matrix
W2 c d e
1 5 −3 −3
2 −3 5 −3
3 −3 −3 5
In this example, y is preferred to x given any single case. Given any pair
of cases, majority vote favors x to y. But, as opposed to the example W1,i n
W2 citing all cases together reverses the pattern again, and y is chosen over
x. Finally, in the following matrix (with ﬁve voters)
W3 c d e
1 3 −1 −1
2 −1 3 −1
3 −1 −1 3
4 −1 −1 −1
5 −1 −1 −1
alternative y is preferred to x for all sets of cases apart from the entire
set C = {c,d,e}.
3How erratic can majority vote be? Are there any conclusions that can
be drawn from the way a society votes given certain subsets of cases to the
way it votes given other subsets? The negative answer is given below. Our
main result is that practically any pattern of votes (as a function of subsets of
cases) can emerge as a result of a democratic vote. We present the model and
t h em a i nr e s u l ti nS e c t i o n2 .I nS e c t i o n3w ed i s c u s st h ec a s eo fv o t e sw i t h
quotas. We show that the choice between two alternatives is as unpredictable
in this case as in the case of simple majority vote. Section 4 is devoted to
the proofs, and Section 5 — to a brief discussion.
2 M o d e la n dM a i nR e s u l t
Let N = {1,...,n} (n ≥ 0)b eas e to fvoters. They are asked to rank
alternatives in a ﬁnite set X. The public debate preceding the vote mentions
as u b s e tM of cases from a ﬁnite set of conceivably relevant cases C.F o r
each voter i ∈ N, each case c ∈ C, and each alternative x ∈ X,t h e r ei sa
decision weight wi(x,c), interpreted as in the Introduction. We refer to the
set of voters, coupled with their decision weights w =( wi(x,c))i∈N,x∈X,c∈C,
as a population (N,w).
A binary relation %⊂ X × X is reﬂexive if x % x for every x ∈ X.I t
is complete if x % y or y % x for every x,y ∈ X. Observe that a complete
relation is also reﬂexive. The asymmetric and symmetric parts of % are
denoted, as usual, as Â and ∼, respectively. A relation % is trivial if %=
X×X,t h a ti s ,i fx ∼ y for every x,y ∈ X. Let the set of all complete binary
relations on X be R = R(X).
Given a set of cases M ⊂ C,w ed e ﬁne society’s preferences by a majority
vote. Formally, %((N,w),M)⊂ X × X is deﬁned as follows: for every x,y ∈ X
and every M ⊂ C, x %((N,w),M) y iﬀ










4Observe that %((N,w),M) is complete for every M.T h u s ,g i v e nap o p u l a t i o n
of voters (N,w),m a j o r i t yv o t ed e ﬁnes a function
V(N,w) :2 C → R
by
V(N,w)(M)= %((N,w),M).
The question we address in this paper is the following: given a function
U :2 C → R, can it be the majority vote of some population? That is,
is there a population (N,w) such that V(N,w) = U? An obvious necessary
condition is that U(∅) be trivial. The following result states that this is also
as u ﬃcient condition.
Theorem 1 Let there be given a function U :2 C → R.T h e r e e x i s t s a
population (N,w) such that V(N,w) = U iﬀ U(∅) is trivial.
In the very speciﬁcc a s ew h e r eC contains only one element, the statement
is a slight generalization of McGarvey (1953) Theorem.
3 Voting with a Quota
There are many decisions in which regular majority does not suﬃce. For
instance, suppose that the set X does not represent candidates for a public
position, but two choices: approve a proposed constitutional amendment or
reject it. In many countries, an amendment would require more than 50%
of the votes in order to be approved. Assume, then, that there is a quota
q ∈ [1
2,1) such that an amendment is approved only if the proportion of voters
supporting it is q or higher. Which sets of cases will induce a q-majority for
the amendment?
Formally, deﬁne, for q ∈ [1
2,1), %((N,w),M,q)⊂ X × X as follows: for every
x,y ∈ X and every M ⊂ C, x %((N,w),M,q) y iﬀ




c∈M wi(y,c)} ≥ q|N|.
When q>1
2, %((N,w),M,q) is not expected to be complete. One may ask
whether any function from subsets of cases to (not necessarily complete)
binary relations can be the result of a q-majority vote of some population.
The negative answer is given by Vieille (2002). He shows that, even if |X| =2 ,
for every q>1
2, there exists a set of cases C and a function from 2C to R
that cannot coincide with %((N,w),M,q) for any (N,w) (that is, that cannot be
the q-majority vote of any population).
In the absence of a q-majority for either alternative, society still has to
make a choice. To this end, there should be a default alternative that is
chosen unless there is a q-majority against it. For instance, in the vote
on a constitutional amendment, the default is that the amendment is not
approved, unless it is supported by at least q of the votes.
Assume, then, that X = {x,y} and that y is the default alternative.
Thus, we re-deﬁne %((N,w),M,q) as follows: x % (Â)((N,w),M,q)y iﬀ




c∈M wi(y,c)} ≥ (>)q|N|
and y Â((N,w),M,q) x whenever x %((N,w),M,q) y does not hold. Let Rs
be the subset of R consisting of strict relations (i.e., for %∈ Rs,e i t h e r
x Â y or y Â x, but not both). Given a population (N,w) we deﬁne
V(N,w,q)(M)= %((N,w),M,q) and ask, which functions U :2 C → Rs can be
the q-majority vote of some population? That is, for which U is there a
population (N,w) such that V(N,w,q) = U?
Proposition 2 Assume that X = {x,y} as above and q>1
2.L e tt h e r eb e
given a function U :2 C → Rs. There exists a population (N,w) such that
V(N,w,q) = U iﬀ U(∅) is trivial.
Thus, in the case of two alternatives our results extends to a majority
vote with quota q>1
2. This result does not extend to the case |X| > 2.
6Observe that with more than two alternatives the default choice deﬁnes a
complete binary relation on X. In general, it is easy to see that not every
pattern of choices may be the majority vote for any q. For instance, for
q>2
3 one may set the default to be a cycle x Â y Â z Â x,a n dr e q u i r et h a t ,
for a given case, preferences be the reverse cycle. It is easy to see that no
population can exhibit such preferences, because no population can vote for
a Condorcet cycle with q>2
3.2
4P r o o f s
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1:
Step 1: The case |X| =2
Assume that X = {x,y}. Without loss of generality, we will assume
that all voters discussed will satisfy wi(y,c)=0for all c ∈ C.T h u s , a
voter with decision weights (wi(x,c))x∈X,c∈C will be characterized by a vector
wi =( wi(x,c))c∈C. She prefers x to y given M ⊂ C if
P
c∈M wi(x,c) > 0.
Some preliminary deﬁnitions will prove useful. For a set of cases D ⊂ C
with |D| = d, a voter with decision weights wi is said to be a D+ voter if
wi(c)=
½ 1
d+1 if c ∈ D
−1 if c/ ∈ D
.
Observe that a D+ voter (strictly) prefers x to y given M 6= ∅ if and only
if M ⊂ D, and she (strictly) prefers y to x otherwise. A voter is a D− voter
if −wi(c) deﬁnes a D+ voter. Thus, a D− voter (strictly) prefers y to x given
M 6= ∅ if and only if M ⊂ D, and she (strictly) prefers x to y otherwise.
A population (N,w) is a k-D+ population if N consists of 2k voters,
where k are D+ voters, and k are ∅− voters. If (N,w) is a k-D+ population,
then, given M 6= ∅, x Â((N,w),M) y if M ⊂ D and x ∼((N,w),M) y otherwise.
2However, it is not clear that this is the most natural deﬁnition of the problem when
|X| > 2. Indeed, majority vote with q>1
2 may not be a very natural procedure for more
than two alternatives.
7Similarly, a population (N,w) is a k-D− population if N consists of 2k voters,
where k are D− voters, and k are ∅+ voters. Thus, if (N,w) is a k-D−
population, then, given M 6= ∅, y Â((N,w),M) x if M ⊂ D and x ∼((N,w),M) y
otherwise.
We now turn to the proof. Let there be given a function U :2 C → R such
that U(∅) is trivial. For M ⊂ D,d e n o t eU(M) by <M and let ÂM, ∼Mhave
their usual meaning. We wish to construct a population (N,w) such that
V(N,w)(M)= %((N,w),M)=<M. This population will be constructed inductively
as the union of k-D+ and k-D− populations, for appropriately chosen sets D
and numbers k.
Let (D1,...,D2|C|−1) be an enumeration of all non-empty subsets of C
that is non-increasing with respect to set cardinality. That is, if r>s ,t h e n
|Dr| ≤ |Ds|.T h u s ,D1 = C, whereas D2|C|−|C|,...,D2|C|−1 are singletons. We
will prove the following claim by induction:
Claim: For every 1 ≤ r ≤ 2|C| − 1, there exists a population (Nr,w (r))
such that, for all Ds with s ≤ r, %((Nr,w(r)),Ds)=<Ds.
Thus, the majority vote of population (Nr,w (r)), V(Nr,w(r))(M), will agree
with the target relation <M for the ﬁrst r sets in (D1,...,D2|C|−1). Setting
r =2 |C| − 1 will complete the proof of Step 1.
Proof of Claim:
For r =1 ,c o n s i d e r<C.I f x ∼C y,s e tNr to be empty. Otherwise, if
x ÂC y,l e t(Nr,w (r)) be a 1-C+ population.
Assume that the claim is true for r − 1 ≥ 1,a n dt h a t(Nr−1,w (r−1))
is the population provided by the induction hypothesis. We will construct
(Nr,w (r)) such that Nr is a superset of Nr−1 and w(r) — an extension of
w(r−1).C o n s i d e r Dr.I f <Dr equals %((Nr−1,w(r−1)),Ds), (Nr,w (r)) can be set
equal to (Nr−1,w (r−1)). Suppose, then, that the two diﬀer. Assume, ﬁrst,
that x %((Nr−1,w(r−1)),Ds) y but that y ÂDr x.D e ﬁne (Nr,w (r)) to be the
disjoint union of (Nr−1,w (r−1)) and a k-D−
r population for a large enough
k.O b s e r v e t h a t k can be chosen so that the majority for y in the k-D−
r
8population outweighs the majority that might exist for x in (Nr−1,w (r−1)).
Speciﬁcally, choose
k = 1










Observe that the diﬀerence in square brackets is even, since our construc-
tion involves only the disjoint union of populations, within each of which
either there is a tie between the two alternatives, or there is an even-size
majority for one of them.
Thus %((Nr,w(r)),Dr) equals <Dr. The main observation is, however, that
%((Nr−1,w(r−1)),Ds) also equals <Ds for s<r .T os e et h i s ,l e ts<rand consider
Ds. Ds diﬀers from Dr (since s 6= r), and it is not a subset of Dr (which is
possible only if s>r ). Hence the k-D−
r population we add, (Nr\Nr−1,w (r)),
consists of exactly k voters who prefer x to y given Ds,a n dk voters whose
preferences are reversed. This implies that whatever was the majority vote
in (Nr−1,w (r−1)) given Ds, it is identical for (Nr,w (r)) given Ds.
Next assume that x Â((Nr−1,w(r−1)),Ds) y but that y ∼Dr x.T h e s a m e
construction applies with
k = 1










Finally, the cases in which y %((Nr−1,w(r−1)),Ds) x are dealt symmetrically
(by addition of an appropriate k-D+
r population).¤
Step 2: The case |X| > 2
Assume that X = {x1,...,xm}. Consider two alternatives, xp and xq.F o r
every M ⊂ C, restrict the relation U(M) to {xp,x q}.U s eS t e p1 to construct
ap o p u l a t i o n(Np,q,w (p,q)),d e ﬁned for {xp,x q}, such that V(Np,q,w(p,q))(M)
equals U(M) on {xp,x q} for every M. We now extend the decision weights
9w(p,q) of voters in Np,q from {xp,x q} to all of X in two distinct ways, and we
will eventually take the union of the two populations thus generated.
First, let (Nt
p,q,wt
(p,q)) be a population of voters (with preferences deﬁned
over all of X), where, for each voter and given any M, {xp,x q} are ranked
above all other alternatives, where the rest are ranked by their index. This
can be done, for instance, by setting w(p,q)i(xr,c)=−r −1 for all r/ ∈ {p,q},
for all c ∈ C, and all i ∈ Nt
p,q. Recall that the construction in step 1 produced
weights wi(x,c) ∈ [−1,1]. It follows that the new weights deﬁned for xr are
lower than those for {xp,x q}.
Next, let (Nb
p,q,w b
(p,q)) be a population of voters (again, with preferences
deﬁned over all of X), for which the opposite is true: given any M, {xp,x q}
are ranked below all other alternatives, where the rest are ranked in reverse
index order. For instance, set w(p,q)i(xr,c)=+ r +1for all r/ ∈ {p,q},f o ra l l
c ∈ C, and all i ∈ Nb
p,q.





(p,q)). Let there be given a set M ⊂ C. Majority vote between xp and
xq is identical in both sub-populations, and is identical to U(M).H e n c ei t





For any pair of indices {r,s}6 = {p,q}, exactly half of the new population
prefers xr to xs, and the other half has reverse preferences. Hence the new
population is indiﬀerent between any pair {xr,x s} such that {r,s}6 = {p,q}.





population, one for each pair {xp,x q}, constructed as above. Majority vote
in the entire population between {xp,x q} is determined by the {xp,x q} sub-
population, and therefore coincides with U(·).¤¤
4.2 Proof of Proposition 2:
Step 1: rational q
Assume that q = t
t+s where t>s>0 are natural numbers. The proof
in this case mimics the Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, with the following
10modiﬁcation.
A population (N,w) is a k-l-D+ population if N consists of k + l voters,
where k are D+ voters, and l are ∅− voters. If (N,w) is a s-t-D+ population,
then, given M 6= ∅, x Â((N,w),M,q) y if M ⊂ D and x ∼((N,w),M,q) y otherwise.
Similarly, a population (N,w) is a k-l-D− population if N consists of k + l
voters, where l are D− voters, and k are ∅+ voters. Thus, if (N,w) is a
s-t-D− population, then, given M 6= ∅, y Â((N,w),M,q) x if M ⊂ D and
x ∼((N,w),M,q) y otherwise.
One continues to construct the population (N,w) inductively, as in the
C l a i mi nt h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m1.T h eo n l yd i ﬀerence is that, if there is a need
to add a sub-population to (Nr−1,w (r−1)) in order to obtain (Nr,w (r)),o n e
adds a ks-kt-D+ population for a large enough natural k (in case x ÂDr y)
and a ks-kt-D− population for a large enough natural k (in case y ÂDr x).¤
Step 2: irrational q
The proof relies on approximating q by rational numbers. As in the case
of a rational q, the construction is based on successive additions of k-l-D+
populations and k-l-D− populations, as the need may be. Only in this con-
struction one uses ks-kt-D+ populations and ks-kt-D− populations, where
t>s>0 are natural numbers such that t
t+s approximates q.S p e c i ﬁcally,
consider stage r in the induction of the Claim. Assume, without loss of
generality that, that x ÂDr y but that y Â((Nr−1,w(r−1)),Dr,q) x,h e n c ew e
are about to add a ks-kt-D+
r population. We ﬁrst choose k,t h e ns and t.
Choose k>
q
1−q|Nr−1|. The population we add will have k(s+t) >kvoters,
and will therefore outweigh the existing population Nr−1 by a ratio of
q
1−q
or more. That is, for any s,t > 0 adding a ks-kt-D+
r population will result
in x Â((Nr,w(r)),Dr,q) y.I t i s l e f t t o c h o o s e s,t > 0 such that Â((Nr,w(r)),Dp,q)
agrees with Â((Nr−1,w(r−1)),Dp,q) for p<r .T ot h i se n d ,l e t







11Observe that ε > 0.C h o o s et>s>0 such that | t
t+s − q| <
|Nr−1|
k(s+t)ε.T h e
existence of such s,t can be derived from the theory of continued fractions.
Indeed, the approximation by continued fractions of an irrational q yields a









Thus, one may set t = pn and s + t = qn where n is large enough.






















that is, x Â((Nr,w(r)),Dp,q) y iﬀ x Â((Nr−1,w(r−1)),Dp,q) y. This completes the
proof.¤¤
5 Discussion
Our result assumes that voter’s preferences are additive in cases. There are
many reasons for which this assumption may be unrealistic. For instance,
imagine that voters prefer candidates who exhibited strong ideological con-
victions in their youth, irrespective of the ideology they subscribed to. A
case in which a candidate supported a communist party, as well as a case in
which the candidate supported a fascist party, will speak well of the candi-
date. But the combination of these cases will point to incoherence, lack of
integrity, or opportunism.
Preferences may not be additive in cases also due to logical inferences that
voters can make, based on strategic reasoning. As pointed out by Glazer and
Rubinstein (2001), the very fact that one party brings forth a particular
argument while it could have brought forth another may be informative in
its own right. Whereas Grice (1975, 1989) may be viewed as suggesting a
strategic analysis of conversations based on the assumption that speakers and
listeners play a common interest game, Glazer and Rubinstein apply strategic
reasoning to debates, in which interests are far from common. Athreya,
12Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2002) analyze Glazer and Rubinstein’s example in
the case-based model we use here. They show that even if preferences are
additive in cases, inferences based on strategic reasoning may lead to non-
additive functions, because mentioning one case in a debate is equivalent to
bringing forth an entire set of cases.
Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2002) discuss situation in
which cases are used to draw the listeners’ attention to analogies or to certain
regularities. These may change the way voters view cases they already know
of, and may therefore be another reason for non-additivity in the way voters
react to cases.
Our main thesis is that the impact of a set of cases on voters may be
hard to predict based on the impact of other sets of cases. Our results
show that even a simple preference structure suﬃces to render society choice
rather complex. Introducing more realistic preferences will only strengthen
our point.
Throughout the paper we refer to elements of C as “cases”, which are
to be thought of as facts or stories. But the formal model also allows other
interpretations. In particular, members of C may be arguments that are
being raised for or against certain alternatives. Again, one ﬁnds that a very
simple rule for aggregation of arguments at the individual level already yields
complex patterns of majority votes.
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